The Jews behind the 1919 Spartacist Uprising in Berlin

The Spartacist Uprising of January 1919 in Berlin, Germany is often treated with kid gloves by historians, while the nationalists who suppressed it are openly vilified as proto-Nazi monsters. (1)

The reality however is that the nationalists – aka the Freikorps – were in many respects the heroes  of the affair, because by their prompt action they put down one of Lenin’s best hopes for spreading the Bolshevik revolution across Europe and ultimately the world. (2)

The roots of the Spartacist Uprising lie in the split between the pro and anti-war factions of the German Socialist Party (SPD).  In 1914 the lone voice in the SPD against voting war credits to German government was a radical socialist deputy named Karl Liebknecht.  Despite often being thought of as being of jewish origin; this was not in fact the case. (3)

Liebknecht spent the entire First World War – even when in prison – mobilising as many people against the war as he could and preaching that their real enemies weren’t the Allies, but rather their ‘class enemies’ at home. (4)

Things began moving more quickly in January 1916 when anonymous letters signed ‘Spartacus’ began circulating that preached this same message to their primarily working class readership. (5)

These were written by Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxembourg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin among others, (6) but were all based off of Rosa Luxembourg’s - a jewish Marxist theorist from Poland – pamphlet ‘The Crisis of German Social Democracy’ that was signed ‘Junius’ and published in December 1915. (7)

Of these individuals: Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi and Rosa Luxembourg were jewish.

These Spartacus letters continued to be written and circulated to the end of the war – giving some credence to the supposed ‘Stab in the Back’ legend – despite Jogiches, Liebknecht and Luxembourg being imprisoned for sedition by the Imperial German authorities.  (8)

Following the German surrender at the end of the First World War in November 1918; Kaiser Wilhelm II went into exile and Chancellor Max von Baden handed over control of the German government to Friedrich Ebert – Chairman of the SPD and head of its pro-war faction – leading to the rise of the so-called Council Republic between November 1918 and parliamentary elections in January 1919. (9)

This was where popular committees sprang up and effectively ran the local administration that previously had been controlled by the Imperial German government and its local administrative proxies. The Spartacists - Jogiches, Liebknecht and Luxembourg having been released by a general amnesty for political prisoners declared by Friedrich Ebert’s new socialist government on 9th November 1918 - (10) interpreted these – somewhat correctly – as being a German version of the Soviets which had been in power between the February and October revolutions of 1917 in Russia. (11)

This belief – in addition to his further political radicalisation - was partly the cause for Karl Liebknecht’s enthusiastic cable to Lenin in Moscow in which he declared that: 

‘The revolution of the German proletariat has begun. This revolution will save the Russian revolution from all attack and will sweep away all the foundations of the imperialist world.’ (12)

Thus we can see that the political situation was escalating rapidly from a radical change in government and the power structure to outright communist revolution by the confederates of Vladimir Lenin.

When the newly-minted Social Democratic Chancellor Friedrich Ebert moved on 1st December 1918 to secure the support of the still powerful Reichswehr in exchange for putting the kibosh on any ‘radical political changes’; it stopped Jogiches, Liebknecht and Luxembourg’s communist revolution in its tracks. (13)

This was because in order to secure the communist revolution that they had worked so long to achieve; they needed the situation to further deteriorate so that – in the words of Marx and Engels – ‘the proletariat will see they have nothing to lose but their chains’.

Following this rapprochement between Ebert’s Social Democratic government and the conservative mainstay of the Reichswehr; the Spartacists and their followers engaged in periodic small-scale violence against their ‘class enemies’ and even attempted to break into the Chancellery building on 13th December 1918. (14)

However it was not until the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) appointees withdrew from government in mid-December 1918 and more specifically the dismissal of Emil Einhorn from his position as police chief and his subsequent refusal to vacate the post on 4th January 1919. (15) That things really began to slide towards an armed uprising.

Liebknecht and Luxembourg among others (including Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi and Clara Zetkin as well as USPD and radical Trade Union representatives) met and agreed that ‘the revolution was at stake’ and called for a public demonstration against the SPD’s collaboration with ‘reactionaries’ and ‘class enemies’. (16)

The response took both the Spartacists and UPSD leaders by complete surprise by its sheer scale given that they were used to a relatively small scale response from loyal party members and a few hangers-on rather than the massive truly proletarian response they received to their summons. (17)

An astonishing 200,000 workers – some armed – came out in support of the call. (18)

This in turn caused the Spartacists and USPD leadership to develop a sense that now was the time for a communist revolution to be launched.

As jewish Spartacist Rosa Levine-Meyer later summed up the mood:  

‘The response of the workers, right down to those of the SPD, was overwhelming and the government was entirely helpless.’ (19)

This belief that the time was right to launch a full-scale communist uprising was given voice in an emergency meeting of Spartacists, USPD leaders and radical trade unionists on the night of the 5-6th January 1919. (20)

The result of these talks – primarily led by Liebknecht with both Jogiches and Luxembourg opposing the resolution – was the decision to call the workers once again out on to the street with the explicit objective of leading them in a revolution. (21)

This should not be understood to mean – as Berduc has rightly pointed out – that Luxembourg was not fully on board with a violent communist revolution, but rather she believed – correctly as it happens – that the rising that Liebknecht so successfully persuaded the meeting to endorse was premature and doomed to fail, because it didn’t currently have the support of the masses. (22)

Despite their reservations however Luxembourg and the other Spartacists such as Jogiches fully committed themselves to the uprising, (23) which was done with the full knowledge of Lenin’s jewish plenipotentiary for bringing about communist revolution in Germany: Karl Radek. (24)

This was not what they had hoped it would be – despite Marxist historians glossing over this rather significant detail and making it sound bigger than it actually was – (25) and a mere 10,000 people heeded Liebknecht and Luxembourg’s call for revolution. (26)

This nondescript mob promptly began to disperse having realised they didn’t have the necessary numbers, but a radical splinter group didn’t and instead mounted an armed takeover of the SPD’s main office and print works. (27) They also managed to post some snipers in and around the city. (28)

The ‘revolution’ when it came was thus something of a damp squid and the enemies of the radical left – both on the right and moderate left – immediately began calling for the Spartacists to be executed wholesale. (29)

Reacting to events and the public mood; Chancellor Ebert’s government promptly called in all the Reichswehr and Freikorps units in the area to deal with the Spartacist rebels and they began to arrest every left-wing activist they could find (30) as well as clear out the communist rabble from their strongholds with armoured cars and machine guns. (31)

It is perhaps ironic – considering their revolution’s jewishness – that Luxembourg and Liebknecht took refuge from the nationalist onslaught with the jewish Marcussohn family in Berlin’s middle class and heavily jewish Wilmersdorf district. (32)

On 15th January 1919 Luxembourg and Liebknecht were famously apprehended by the Freikorps. Then promptly tried and summarily executed with the consent of Ebert’s government on 16th January 1919. (33)

What we can see from the foregoing discussion is not only was the Spartacist uprising unpopular among the working classes that it claimed to be liberating, but that most of its leaders were in fact jewish.

References

(1) For an example of the histrionic treatment meted out to them see Nigel Jones, 2004, ‘A Brief History of the Birth of the Nazis: How the Freikorps Blazed a Trail for Hitler’, 2nd Edition, Robinson: London

(2) Robert Service, 2008, ‘Comrades: Communism: A World History’, 1st Edition, Pan: London, p. 85

(3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Liebknecht#Background; also see the failure to mention his being so in Adolf Ehrt, 1990, [1933], ‘Communism in Germany: The Communist Conspiracy on the Eve of the 1933 National Revolution’, 1st Edition, Noontide Press:  Costa Mesa, p. 16

(4) Manuel Berduc, 2016, ‘Against Putschism: Paul Levi’s Politics, the Comintern, and the Problems of a European Revolution 1918-1923’, Bachelors Thesis: University of Minnesota, p. 17

(5) Ibid, p. 18

(6) Ibid; Howard Sachar, 2003, ‘Dreamland: Europeans and Jews in the Aftermath of the Great War’, 1st Edition, Vintage: New York, p. 225

(7) Sachar, Op. Cit., pp. 217; 225

(8) Ibid, p. 225

(9) Pierre Broue, 2006, ‘The German Revolution, 1917-1923’, 1st Edition, Haymarket: Chicago, pp. 158-159

(10) Sachar, Op. Cit., p. 226

(11) Broue, Op. Cit., pp. 158-159

(12) Service, Op. Cit., p. 86

(13) Sachar, Op. Cit., p. 225

(14) Ibid, pp. 225; 227

(15) Ibid, p. 225; Berduc, Op. Cit., pp. 29-30

(16) Berduc, Op. Cit., p. 30; Chris Harman, 1997, ‘The Lost Revolution: Germany 1918 to 1923’, 2nd Edition, Bookmarks: London, p. 73

(17) Berduc, Op. Cit., pp. 30-31; Harman, Op. Cit., pp. 73-75

(18) Broue, Op. Cit., pp. 241-242

(19) Harman, Op. Cit., p. 77

(20) Sachar, Op. Cit., p. 227

(21) Ibid.; Berduc, Op. Cit., pp. 31-32

(22) Berduc, Op. Cit., pp. 31-32

(23) Sachar, Op. Cit., p. 227

(24) Harman, Op. Cit., p. 77

(25) Ibid., pp. 77-81

(26) Berduc, Op. Cit. p. 32

(27) Ibid., pp. 23-33

(28) Harman, Op. Cit., p. 77

(29) Berduc, Op. Cit., pp. 32-33

(30) Ibid., p. 33

(31) Ibid.; Sachar, Op. Cit., p. 227

(32) Sachar, Op. Cit., p. 227

(33) Ibid., Berduc, Op. Cit., p. 33