Source Texts on ‘Generalplan Ost’ #1: Erhard Wetzel’s 7th February 1942 Letter to the Eastern Ministry

Since the ‘Holocaust’ has long been exposed has a historical nonsense in nationalist circles there has been an increasing tendency to try and find something to use to try and claim that National Socialism was/is evil/bad and the most common two – and somewhat related things – is the Third Reich’s treatment of Poles and then – separately but linked – treatment (or projected treatment) of Slavs in general.

The cornerstone of both of these claims is what historians refer to as ‘Generalplan Ost’ which was a real policy document but which we don’t in fact have and what is claimed as ‘Generalplan Ost’ is in fact a post-war reconstruction that began to be created in the 1950s and 1960s following the discovery of Erhard Wetzel’s memorandum on the subject in 1957 and which is claimed to create an intellectual framework of ‘genocidal anti-Slavic racial supremacy’ that the alleged atrocities against Poles and Slavs that the Third Reich is claimed to engaged in from 1939 to 1944/45 in Eastern Europe are placed in.

This narrative claims that the Third Reich was planning to ‘exterminate’/’wipe out’ all – or at least large numbers – Poles and Slavs in general in the East and as such it is claimed that ‘Hitler/National Socialism was/is anti-White/anti-European’ but in truth this is typical ill-thought out hogwash that is believed not because of the evidence but because it serves a propaganda purpose.

Now it is worth noting that bulk of what we know about ‘Generalplan Ost’ comes from Wetzel’s memorandums of 7^th February 1942 and 27^th April 1942 and when we read these as a whole together – rather than just out-of-context snippets – it becomes very clear that those who claim ‘Generalplan Ost’ was some kind of homicidal ‘extermination’ operation are not only being unintentionally dishonest but are actively lying.

This is part of a series of original German sources that will be translated into English to allow readers to easily address and correct the anti-German libel that is the conventional ‘interpretation’ of ‘Generalplan Ost’ as being a kind of ‘Slavic Holocaust’, because – as is often the case – the sources speak for themselves. The source we will reproduce in English translation here is Wetzel’s 7^th February 1942 Memorandum to Otto Brautigam of the Eastern Ministry regarding the initial discussions around ‘Generalplan Ost’.

My analysis of these all documents will be published separately possibly in monograph or book form. My comments will be in the form of numbered notes and in-line commentary using square brackets.

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Main Department I 1/1/1263/41 Berlin, on 7^th February 1942

SECRET!

To Dr. Brautigam (1) Received: 11. MRZ 1942 (2)

Report on the meeting of 4^th February, 1942, at Dr. Kleist’s (3) residence concerning the issues of Germanization, particularly in the Baltic countries.

Among those present at the meeting were a number of representatives from interested agencies.

The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kleist; also present from the Ministry for the Eastern Territories were: Dr. Kinkelin, (4) Professor von Mende, (5) AGR Weitnauer, (6) ORR Labs, (7) and Assessor Schutte. (8)

The interests of the Reichsfuhrer-SS were represented by the following:

(From the) Reich Security Main Office (RHSA):

Obersturmbannfuhrer Gummitsch, as representative of Standartenfuhrer Ehrlich. (9) (It was interesting that Gummitsch, although he came from the most interested and powerful branch of the Reichsfuhrer SS’ offices — I may point out that the Generalplan Ost originated from this branch — did not speak at all in the meeting), as well as Party Comrade Girgensohn. (10)

(From the) Race and Settlement Main Office (RuSHA):

Standartenfuhrer Professor B. K. Schulz (11)

(From the Office of the) Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood [= Himmler]:

Section Leader Schubert (12)

Dr. Teich (13) from the Institute of Borderland and Foreign Studies also attended.

Professor Eugen Fischer (14) from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology also participated in the meeting.

After Dr. Kleist had outlined the problems in the East that would arise from possible Germanization, and after Professor Fischer and Dr. Kinkelin had also commented, B. K. Schulz then stated that a distinction had to be made between population groups in the East who were racially suited to Germanization, those that would be considered [for possible Germanization], and those that would have to be rejected [for Germanization].

His statements revealed that he was clearly inclined to believe that the majority of the population was not suitable for Germanization. He was of the opinion that those deemed racially undesirable should be evacuated [= deported] to the East, (15) while those deemed racially desirable should be Germanized within the Old Reich or possibly also in the Eastern Territories. Schubert then took this position even further, suggesting that those deemed undesirable should be evacuated to Western Siberia. (16) In his introduction, he once again emphasized that the sole responsibility of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood [= Himmler] in all these matters. (17) He assumed that the examination of the Poles had revealed only 3% to be racially valuable and therefore capable of Germanization.

As B. K. Schulz later informed me, Schubert’s statement was incorrect. Current research - which only considers rural populations - indicates a figure of 5%. The urban population - where the percentage of those deemed racially valuable is likely to be significantly higher - has not yet been studied at all. Schubert must have been aware of these findings! Schubert further stated that the number of racially valuable individuals was not that substantial among the Baltic peoples either. (18)

Settlement of the country [= the East] with Germans is not impossible. We [= the representatives of the Eastern Ministry] objected to these statements as follows:

If those people who are separated by the deportation from those deemed racially undesirable - specifically by the forced deportation of these individuals to the east [and] particularly to Siberia - this can only lead to the consequence that even those deemed racially desirable - especially if they have some kinship ties with the other ethnic groups - will not consider Germanization. Furthermore, if they are forced to relocate to the Old Reich, the situation could be exacerbated by the fact that they might not find suitable employment and could face social disadvantages; thus, further undermining their willingness to Germanize. (19) It should be considered whether the industrialization of the Baltic region could expedite the elimination [= getting rid of/reducing over time by policies, deportation and/or voluntary resettlement not killing] of the racially undesirable segments of the population. If they were given adequate wages and their cultural status were improved, a decrease in the birth rate could likely be expected [as a result].

Professor Fischer then declared his reservations concerning this idea, as the improved standard of living could easily lead to an increase in the birth rate (this statement by Fischer is only correct insofar as it concerns explicitly antisocial individuals). (20)

Representatives of the SS also objected to this idea concerning the racially undesirable people in the Ostland [= ‘Reichskommissariat Ostland’ roughly western Belarus and all of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania]. Schubert claimed that the Fuhrer had already ordered their evacuation [of racially undesirable individuals]. (21) Party comrade Girgensohn from the Reich Security Main Office then elaborated at length; stating that while a forced evacuation of the undesirable population in the Baltic states was extremely problematic and therefore unacceptable [as] even during the Tsarist era, Estonians, Latvians, and others had shown a tendency to emigrate voluntarily to the Russian territories if offered secure employment. He was convinced that much could still be achieved today through such voluntary resettlement. (22) Experience has shown that it is impossible to establish an administration of the territories using Russian forces alone. Therefore - especially since German forces are in no way sufficient - it is necessary to work with the help of other nations. (23)

He therefore considered it highly appropriate to integrate the racially undesirable members of the Baltic peoples into this society as a middle class. Those concerned would have to be well paid for their circumstances. (24) Russification was hardly to be expected. B. K. Schulz then explained that he, too, had developed serious reservations about the forced evacuation from these countries to Siberia. One should try to achieve voluntary resettlement. Schubert also concurred with these statements. He explained that the Germans should have the position of the Spartans, the middle class consisting of Latvians, Estonians, and the like the position of the perioikoi, and the Russians the position of the helots. (25)

The view of Party Comrade Girgensohn - that the undesirables in question should be deported to the Russian territory as voluntarily as possible - evidently met with the assembly’s approval. The question of the Czechs and Poles was also touched upon. It was suggested that the Czechs, insofar as they were undesirable, could probably also be classified as middle class, unless they were particularly politically suspect. (26) Regarding the Poles, it was argued that a solution involving their deportation to Western Siberia was only conceivable for the eastern territories. (27)

At the end of the meeting, there was unanimous agreement that the settlement of Germans could only proceed by first settling the nearest areas - such as the Warthegau - and that, with regard to the eastern territories, a thorough examination of the population had to be carried out beforehand. This examination should not be presented as a racial census, but rather disguised as a hygienic examination or similar, so as not to cause unrest among the population. (28)

Furthermore, it was understood that all the resettlement issues in the area of ​​the Eastern Territory were tasks that could not be tackled immediately.

Dr. Wetzel

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References

(1) Otto Brautigam; deputy to Georg Leibbrandt who headed the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories’ Political Office; the Ministry itself was run by Alfred Meyer and headed by Alfred Rosenberg. (Helmut Krausnick, 1958, ‘Der Generalplan Ost’, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 3, p. 293, n. 1-2)

(2) Date Received: 11th March 1942

(3) Bruno Peter Kleist: SS-Sturmbannfuhrer (Major), a lawyer whose doctoral thesis dealt with the international legal recognition of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the German-Polish Society, long-time advisor on Eastern Europe to the German Foreign Office and Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Also, the head of the Ostland Department (meaning he supervised ‘Reichskommissariat Ostland’ [the Baltic States plus part of Belarus] and is the person to whom Reichskommissar Hinrich Lohse nominally reported) of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories under Georg Leibbrandt. Worked with Baltic exiles and acted with Leibrandt to set up resistance organizations to the Soviet occupation between 1940 and 1941. Further acted as the liaison between the Eastern Ministry and Army Group North during Operation Barbarossa.

(4) Wilhelm Kinkelin: SS-Oberfuhrer (Senior Colonel) in the SD and a medical doctor by training. Also, the head of the Ukraine Department (meaning he supervised Reichskommissariat Ukraine and was the person to whom Reichskommissar Erich Koch nominally reported) and the ‘Race and Settlement Office’ of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories under Georg Leibbrandt. Kinkelin was also Deputy Head of the SS-Ahnenerbe, head of the Reichsnahrstand’s (‘Reich Food Office’) main office under Walther Darre and combined all these roles with continuing to be an active member of the SD in the Reich Security Main Office (RHSA). Kinkelin had also previously worked in the ‘Race and Settlement Main Office’ (RuSHA) in 1937, which explains why he headed the Eastern Ministry’s ‘Race and Settlement Office’. In yet another addition to this Kinkelin was – and still is – a well-regarded historian of German local history as he wrote a history of the Swabian town of Pfullingen and the district of Gonningen.

(5) Gerhard von Mende. A Baltic German historian born in Riga, Latvia who was an academic specialist on the ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union and their struggles for national identity and independence. His principal academic work was his 1934 book ‘Die Volker der Sowjetunion’ (lit. ‘The Peoples of the Soviet Union’) which was based on his 1933 doctoral thesis at the University of Breslau ‘Studien zur Kolonization in der Sowjetunion’ (lit. ‘Studies on Colonization in the Soviet Union’) and covered Soviet nationalities policy. His principal academic focus after his thesis was the Asiatic and Islamic minorities in the Soviet Union; von Mende was fluent in Arabic, French, Latvian and Turkish as well as German. He was also the head of the Caucasus’ Department in Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories under Georg Leibbrandt. He would have been responsible for ‘Reichskommissariat Kaukasien’ (the Reichskommissar would have been Arno Schickedanz, who was also born in Estonia and was a Baltic German like von Mende) had it been created but was historically frustrated by the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad and subsequent withdrawal from the Caucasus. Von Mende was also later a major figure in the mass German recruitment of Soviet minorities from the Caucasus to serve in the various national legions as in the ‘Osttruppen’ (lit. ‘Eastern Troops’) units of the Wehrmacht, paid work as ‘Eastern Labourers’ and to work as intelligence agents for the Third Reich in their home countries. Interesting von Mende closely worked with Claus von Stauffenberg; the later head of the famous July 1944 Bomb Plot against Hitler suggesting that claims that Stauffenberg’s disenchantment with the Third Reich had little to actually do with the Third Reich’s policies in the East.

(6) Dr. Weitnauer; a District Judge (‘AGR’ is an abbreviation of ‘Amtsgerichtsrat’ which translates roughly as ‘District Judge’) who was the head of the ‘Civil and Commercial Law’ section of the legal department of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

(7) Senior Councillor Dr. Labs (‘ORR’ is an abbreviation of ‘Oberregierungsrat’ which translates best as ‘Senior Councillor’ or ‘Senior Advisor’) who of the head of the ‘Internal Administration’ section of the administrative department of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

(8) Ehrenfried Schutte; a member of Bruno Peter Kleist’s ‘Ostland’ department of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. He helped run the Eastern Trade Fair in Konigsberg from 1937 to 1939 and between 1934 and 1936 worked as a case officer for Germans in Poland for the ‘Verband deutscher Vereine im Ausland’ (lit. ‘The Alliance of German Organizations Abroad’). From 1942 Schutte was transferred to the Abwehr as an officer in the ‘Bermann Battalion’; a German commando unit formed in the autumn of 1941 composed of circa 300 Germans and 1,200 members of Soviet minorities (Georgians, North Caucasians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians) used for special operations by the Wehrmacht. The unit primarily engaged in anti-partisan activity in Georgia and the Crimea before being re-deployed as anti-partisan specialists to Greece and to put down the Warsaw Uprising alongside the Dirlewanger Brigade in 1944. Its most significant achievement was a commando raid to rescue 300 Soviet deserters in late 1942 who wished to join the Wehrmacht.

(9) Hans Ehrlich: SS-Standartenfuhrer (Colonel) and a medical doctor by training who joined the SD in 1936. Ehrlich headed the ‘Folk and Folk Health’ [sometimes translated as ‘Ethnic German’] section of Department III of the RHSA (better-known as the ‘Inland-SD’) which focused on the health, interests and general wellbeing of the ethnic German Diaspora.

(10) I have transliterated ‘Pg Girgensohn’ as ‘Parteigenosse Girgensohn’ and thus ‘Party Comrade Girgensohn’ in English here. The reference is to Thomas Girgensohn, who was an SA-Brigadefuhrer, a Baltic German, a friend of Heinrich Himmler’s and also a member of the SS-Ahnenerbe. Girgensohn also acted as a liaison between the SA and SS.

(11) Bruno Kurt Schultz: SS-Standartenfuhrer (Colonel) was an anthropologist who was a Professor of Racial Biology at the University of Berlin; he had been the head of Department I (the Racial Office; basically, the department that performed racial selection for the SS) of the Race and Settlement Main Office (RuSHA) since the autumn of 1941.

(12) Schubert: SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer (Captain), head of Section 3 (Race) of Department I (Race and Settlement) in the Office of Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood (RKFDV). Hans Ehrlich later claimed that Schubert and the RKFDV were the true origin of ‘Generalplan Ost’ (Krausnick, Op. Cit., p. 294, n. 6) which Wetzel’s comment about the lack of any comments from Gummitsch as Ehrlich’s delegate to the meeting suggests may be accurate but it could also well be Ehrlich trying to ‘save himself’ at Nuremberg by throwing the blame on Schubert and the RKFDV as well on its leader: Himmler and his RKFDV chief of staff Ulrich Greifelt.

(13) Gerhard Teich: SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer (Captain) was a sociologist specialising in the study of Estonia – in 1941 Teich completed his doctorate in sociology with a thesis titled ‘Bauerntum und Volkskunde in Estland’ (lit. ‘Peasantry and Folklore in Estonia’) – he worked as an assistant under the noted German ethnologist and palaeontologist Karl Christian von Loesch at the Institute of Borderland and Foreign Studies. In Teich’s 1942 book ‘Peoples, Ethnic Groups and Tribes in the Former Territory of the USSR’ (‘Völker, Volksgruppen und Volksstämme auf dem ehemaligen Gebiet der UdSSR’) he thanks Bruno Kurt Schultz (see note 11), Gerhard von Mende (see note 5), Wetzel and the RuSHA for their help (Krausnick, Op. Cit., p. 294, n. 7) suggesting that there was a close community of academic specialists and Baltic Germans involved in the planning of ‘Generalplan Ost’ rather than it being a hare-brained scheme from Hitler, Himmler and parts of the SS as is usually claimed.

(14) Eugen Fischer: a medical doctor and anthropologist by training, head of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics from 1927, the co-author of the 1921 two volume book ‘Menschliche Erblichkeitslehre und Rassenhygiene’ (translated into English in 1936 from its 1932 second edition as ‘Human Heredity Theory and Racial Hygiene’) with Erwin Baur (a geneticist and botanist) and Fritz Lenz (a geneticist). This book was directly cited by Adolf Hitler in ‘Mein Kampf’ as being the basis for his racial theories; Lenz joined Fischer at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics in 1933 heading up the newly created eugenics department while Baur (who died in December 1933) had been affiliated with the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Breeding Research since the 1910s/1920s. All three were leading scientists and proponents of what we’d now called Nordicism and the importance of racial purity for the genetic health of nations.

(15) ‘Er war der Auffassung, daß die rassisch Unerwünschten nach dem Osten evakuiert werden müßten’ – Note the near identical use of terminology used in the Wannsee Conference of 20th January 1942 and Himmler’s ‘Posen Speeches’ of 4^th and 6^th October 1943 which refer to the ‘evacuation of jews’ and which are read as ‘codewords for genocide’, but yet are directly used here to refer to the mass deportation/relocation of large parts of the ‘Eastern peoples’ not their genocide. A similar truism holds true in regard to Himmler’s comments Posen on 4^th October 1943 where he mentions ‘evacuation’ in the context of the word ‘ausrottung’ and which is often badly translated as ‘I am thinking now of the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish people’ but if read in the context of the term ‘evacuation’ (both at Wannsee as well as in the Generalplan Ost documentation) it should read ‘I am thinking now of the evacuation of the Jews, the extirpation of the Jewish people’ which means Himmler is – in line with Wannsee and also Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum (both of which directly state or imply a territorial solution to the jewish question ‘in the East’) – that the Germans had a territorial solution in mind for both the ‘Eastern peoples’ ‘who could not be Germanized’ as well as the jews rather like the Soviet creation of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in 1928/1934.

(16) ‘daß die Unerwünschten nach Westsibirien evakuiert werden müßten’ – Once again note the explicit use of ‘evacuate’ to describe the projected German policy of deporting/relocation large parts of the ‘Eastern peoples’ further to the East: in this case to western Siberia.

(17) This is a good example of institutional politics in the Third Reich in that Himmler as head of the RKFDV is trying to seize control of Eastern policy from Alfred Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. There is also evidence that Martin Bormann as head of the NSDAP’s party organization – and thus also the NSDAP/AO (‘Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP’ = ‘Foreign Organization of the NSDAP’) – was trying to do the same thing around this time (see Dr. Markull of the Eastern Ministry’s letter cited [however badly] in International Military Tribunal, ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946’, Vol. 11, 1st Edition, International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, pp. 541-543 which sarcastically parodies Bormann’s political calls for radical actions in the East as unworkable nonsense and has often been quoted as if it was Bormann’s own words when it is Markull sarcastically parodying Bormann).

(18) Note the significant German uncertainty about how many ‘Eastern peoples’ would be suitable for Germanization and that the Germans here are working with ‘worst case scenarios’ not ‘best case scenarios’.

(19) Note the mention that Germanization was not mandatory but voluntary and the German authorities want suitable ‘Eastern peoples’ to choose Germanization not have it forced upon them, which again contradicts the orthodox ‘Generalplan Ost’ narrative.

(20) Note the substantial disagreement between the Eastern specialists like Wetzel and the race specialists like Fischer, which illustrates that just how much disagreement there was around just how many of the Baltic/Slavic ‘Eastern peoples’ would be suitable for Germanization.

(21) There is no such Fuhrer Directive that I am aware of; although the Germans had begun to deport jews and political prisoners from Reichskommissariat Ostland at this point so Schubert may be bluffing to try and push what he believed to be Himmler’s political agenda here, have meant jews rather than other ‘racially undesirable people’ or he may have been mistaken.

(22) Note that Girgensohn as Himmler’s friend and personal representative to the meeting argues for a large-scale voluntary re-settlement program for ‘racially undesirable people’ in Belarus and the Baltics using financial incentives and explicitly states that the use of force would be counterproductive. This is then later approved/agreed to by the attendees at the meeting; almost completely removing any forced relocation from the table and is probably what triggered Bormann’s 27^th July 1942 letter to the head of the Eastern Ministry’s political department Georg Leibrandt advocating more radical measures.

(23) Himmler is referring here to the lack of German manpower to secure any kind of mass deportation hence why it is impractical so the Germans need to keep those who are being re-settled on side so they can help staff the envisaged voluntarily re-location operation.

(24) What Girgensohn is advocating for here is the integration of ‘racially unsuitable peoples’ from the Baltic States to form a well-paid middle class.

(25) Schubert agrees with Girgensohn and Schulz – again suggesting this was actually Himmler’s position on the matter as all these were either close to Himmler or senior experts within the SS – and use the example of Sparta to illustrate what they mean: with racially suitable people (be they currently Balts, Russians, Belarussians or Germans) who have accepted Germanization forming the social and military elite (the Spartiates), the racially unsuitable population of the Baltics forming a well-paid middle class (the Perioikoi) and the racially unsuitable population of Russians (and presumably Belarussians) forming the working class (the Helots). We should note that the Germans are not sure just how racially suitable or unsuitable people are in the Baltic States and Western Belarus (this comes out even more strongly Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum) so they are working on worst case estimates, but they are also not referring to Russians or Belarussians as necessarily being ‘future Helots’ (this is again frequently quoted out of context and also not in line with what Helots were in Spartan society and is usually falsely claimed to be a synonym for ‘future slaves’) but rather pointing out that only racially unsuitable Russians or Belarussians would be part of the future working class of Reichskommissariat Ostland until they were voluntarily transferred over the course of some thirty years to new self-governing national states under German supervision in and around Moscow and west of the Urals which again is heavily clarified in Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum.

(26) Note that that the same policy as applied to Baltic peoples is advocated here for the Czechs and once again it is stressed that only some of the Czech people will be deemed as racially unsuitable. Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum adds in the detail that just like the racially unsuitable Russians and Belarussians in Reichskommissariat Ostland; the racially unsuitable Czechs would be deported (once again as voluntarily as possible primarily using financial incentives) to a new self-governing nation state under German supervision around the Urals (along with racially unsuitable Poles who would also get their own self-governing nation state under German supervision in that area) over the course of thirty years or so.

(27) See note 26. This is confirmed in Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum but it is noteworthy that the Germans are only looking to apply this policy to eastern Poland not western Poland: presumably the German belief was that western Poland was largely Germanic already so most of the population would eventually be Germanized and the eastern provinces of Poland were more Slavic (who were considered a mixed race by the Germans; thus there were racially suitable as well as racially unsuitable Slavs which is why so much emphasis is placed by the German eastern and race experts on finding out just how many Slavs were in fact Germanic and how many were not). This correction to the historical narrative in order to understand German population policy (and thus also ‘Generalplan Ost’) as the Germans themselves understood it not as it was presented by Allied and Soviet propaganda during and after the war shows how completely the German intentions have been distorted from a well-thought long-term and largely voluntary re-settlement policy that included many ‘Eastern peoples’ being Germanized and those who were not suitable being voluntarily resettled to new self-governing nation states under German supervision in the East to a genocidal and impractical policy that included next to no Germanization as well as extreme violence towards the Polish and Slavic population in general.

(28) Once again Wetzel and the attendees at the meeting stressed that they would have to conduct a long-term widespread population study of areas of the Soviet Union earmarked for Germanization in order to ascertain how many of the inhabitants were in fact racially suitable and racially unsuitable; put another way Wetzel is informing us that the Germans are unsure just how many racially suitable and unsuitable people there are in the East so they need to plan for the worst (very few racially suitable people; hence the 3% of Schubert and the 5% of Schulz) and hope for the best (large numbers of racially suitable people; who can simply be offered voluntary Germanisation) which again is substantially discussed in Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum.

(29) This is again stressed in Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum and the timeline of thirty years is given for this resettlement policy.