Jews: The First Terrorists
It is a dusty, bustling marketplace in the Middle East: you can taste the sand in your mouth and smell the thick scent of spices in the air. You can hear the siren calls of stall vendors drumming business and the high-pitched exclamations of merchant and customer haggling over the price of a sack of spice.
Then the serenity is broken by a commotion, a loud crash and screams. Immediately the market erupts into chaos as people alternatively flee for safety or run to see what has happened. A chaotic scene has occurred near the centre of the market with the town magistrate lying dead in the sand and several bystanders on the floor bleeding profusely or crying for a healer.
You can hear the cry of 'Help! Help!' in the air and the sound of heavily shod feet with metallic clanking announces that the forces of law and order on their way. However, the culprits have made their getaway: they look just like everyone else.
How are the forces of law and order to catch them now?
The answer is that they can't. But yet everybody knows who did this: religious fanatics who want to destroy the state and kill anyone who doesn't comply with their vision of a theocracy run on their interpretation of the will of the One True God.
The above scene is one that I am sure many readers will associate with the modern Middle East and the Islamist insurgency against their rulers. You might think of the murders in Tunisia, Yemen, Lebanon or Pakistan.
Yet what I am describing above occurred centuries before the birth of Mohammed and just after the death of Jesus. This was the original war on terror, and it wasn't the West fighting Islamic fundamentalists, but rather the Roman Empire fighting jewish fundamentalists. It was these jews who invented our modern conception of terrorism to a significant extent, and it is these jews - as one recent authority rightly observes - (1) who clearly demonstrate that if Islam is a terrorist religion: then it only became one because it is heavily-based (to the point of outright plagiarism) on Judaism.
These jewish terrorists (a designation that is not even contested) (2) were known as Sicarii (literally 'Daggermen') and they were jewish fundamentalists fighting a three-fold religious war, which had three objectives. The first was to force the Roman Empire to leave Judea. The second was to purge all those jews who collaborated with Rome or oppressed fellow jews. The third was to purify jewish society and religious observance along the lines of their own ideas about how a pure Judaism should look and act.
The Sicarii - often confused with the Zealots from whom they originated as a splinter group in circa 50 A.D. - were the ancient equivalent of suicide bombers (before suicide bombers could well... blow themselves up) and the famous Islamic sect of the Assassins. They were fighting for a state based on strict religious observance - which wouldn't be looked unfavourably on by even the most flea-bitten of jihadis - to the precepts of Judaism (in their interpretation of it) and were the (essentially) militant arm of a broader insurgency that was centred on the Zealot party. (3)
The Sicarii - like the Islamists of today - were the archetypal terrorists who primarily attacked soft targets such as civilians who opposed them or collaborators with the Roman Empire. Josephus - himself associated with radical anti-Roman jewish religious groups before he surrendered to the future Emperor Vespasian - narrates one such incident as follows:
'When the countryside had been cleared of them, [religious fundamentalist guerillas – K.R.] another type of bandit sprang up in Jerusalem, known as 'Sicarii'. These men committed numerous murders in broad daylight and in the middle of the city. Their favourite trick was to mingle with festival crowds, concealing under their garments small daggers with which they stabbed their opponents. When their victims fell, the assassins melted into the indignant crowd, and through their plausibility entirely defied detection. The first to have his throat cut by them was Jonathan the high priest, and after him many were murdered every day. More terrible than the crimes themselves was the fear they aroused, every man hourly expected death, as in war. They watched at a distance for their enemies, and not even when their friends came near did, they trust them; yet in spite of their suspicions and precautions they were done to death; such was the suddenness of the conspirators' attack and their skill in avoiding detection.' (4)
If you think about the above describes a very similar modus operandi to modern day Islamist terrorists with the only significant difference that the Sicarii didn't have high explosives to kill their opponents in large numbers in one go and spread terror. So instead of blowing themselves up: they did what Islamists today still do a significant amount of the time. That is make use of targeted killings of well-known figures in public places: demonstrating their capability to get to any individual or group and thus spreading the fear of God (pun intended) into their opponents.) (5)
The Sicarii didn't attack the Roman legions as to do so was suicide: as their own experience during Felix's (the Roman procurator) reprisals against them demonstrated (the Sicarii gathered together their followers in the desert and fought a small Roman force in a pitched battle losing miserably). (6) However, because the token Roman force in Judea was at Caeserea (Syria proper in the north was the main garrison for the area) and the Romans relied on locally-raised militia to act as policemen: it was possible to avoid a head-on confrontation with the regular Roman soldiery. (7)
To create a situation where jews might be more amenable to their politics the Sicarii - like the Islamists of today - engaging in acts of propaganda such as demonstrating their pledge to alleviate the sufferings of the jewish poor by burning the debt registers at the Temple in Jerusalem (8) as well as their burning down the palatial homes of the jewish priests. (9)
When this object of rousing sufficient religious fervour - or just simple socio-economic factors rationalized by religious fanaticism - (10) among the jews had been achieved: the Sicarii (lead by a jew named Menahem who - it is generally agreed based on Josephus' account - was an egotistical religious tyrant who dressed in finery and considered himself the future ruler of the world) (11) managed to sneak into the Herodian fortress at Masada and murder the Roman garrison as they slept. (12)
An act which is not at all an uncommon attempt in areas where jihadi attacks are common: such examples can frequently be seen in the attacks on bases and outposts of the Pakistani military near the tribal areas and also in the attempts to infiltrate NATO bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. The missions themselves if successful seize a powerful piece of territory and if not will spread fear and terror at the audacity of attacking a far more powerful opponent so openly (with all the attendant risks).
The Sicarii then proceeded to install their own garrison at Masada, which numbered several hundred fighters and their families. (13) This - as Goodman records - (14) was the majority of their members and had been predicated by their failed coup against the Zealots and Galileans in Jerusalem (who were themselves splinters from original jewish fundamentalist radicals). (15) This may have been conceived of by the Sicarii in the same way that the Taliban used the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan in the wake of the NATO invasion of Afghanistan: as a way of using terrain and fortification to level the military playing field against a foe with superior equipment and/or numbers.
Given Masada's reputation and the fact that it was a purpose-built super-fortress (meant to be a Herodian hiding place in case of revolt): the Sicarii probably felt that they (with Yahweh's blessing of course as they were after religious fanatics) (16) were invincible and could thus engage the Romans and other jewish factions with impunity. However naturally enough the (first) jewish revolt was squelched by the Roman forces with - in spite of common Zionist odes to it - the amount of time it took being simply accounted for by the time it took to dispatch fresh forces to the area (as those in Syria proper were needed to keep an eye on the Parthian Empire) and the fact that it wasn't just one group revolting, but rather a whole series of them (one of which was the Sicarii). (17)
Indeed, the siege of the Sicarii in Masada often overlooks the simple fact that the Romans didn't actually besiege it for most of the siege, but rather left some troops to surround it and bottle up the Sicarii (and begin the construction of the massive siege rampart), while they went around and crushed all the local jewish settlements supporting the rebellion. Only in the last 2-3 months did the Romans return and - in a phrase - get serious about Masada, which they reduced in a matter of days – if not with a single attack by second rate troops (their Auxilia not the famous Legionaries) which the archaeology suggests contrary to Josephus’ account - in spite of frenetic (although utterly ineffectual) Sicarii resistance. (18)
Although this wasn't the last of the Sicarii (a large sect of them operated in Alexandria in Egypt as well and they promptly lead their followers out into the desert) (19): the defeat at Masada more or less broke their backbone as an organized terrorist force, because it had helpfully concentrated most of their fighters together in one place where they could be bottled up and exterminated at leisure.
This is again much like modern Islamists who when they have stopped to fight conventional wars tend to not only lose but lose horrifically. Instead, we can see this behaviour of the Sicarii as more of a strategic mistake (and a not uncommon one historically). (20) Thus, in the long term it was strategically beneficial to engage in terrorism as after all when you are a terrorist and attack soft targets (as the Sicarii did and Islamists tend to do). Then you have the advantage that your targets frequently don't have any inkling you are coming and more importantly: don't shoot back (as a bullet in the chest can seriously crimp even a religious zealot's style).
Goodman's rather amusing attempt to trying and ascribe to Judaism a status as 'not causing terrorism' (21) on the basis of a 'multiplicity of opinions' (22) is frankly ludicrous. His argument is rather like stating - if you will - that a follower of Marxism does not want to eliminate the existence of the bourgeoisie, because there was a (and still are) 'multiplicity of opinions' inside of Marxism on the subject of who and what the bourgeoisie are (and how precisely they are to be dealt with). In essence Goodman is making an argument that Judaism is not responsible for the production of jewish religious fanatics, because there are opinions in Judaism other than those of religious fanatics.
That as such is true, but it is disingenuous in so far as it is asserting that a religion that regards its followers as a national unit (cf. Ezra and Nehemiah for example let alone the Mishnah), regards those who are not its followers as effectively sub-human (hardly controversial if one but reads the Mishnah, Gemara and then looks at even modern rabbinic opinion such as that of the late Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel) and believes that it has a destiny (and will) rule the world (the basic assumption required to believe in Judaism) is ipso facto not going to produce numerous religious fanatics bent on doing just that.
Thus, we can see that the Muslim bent on jihad that we hear so much about today is merely a modern version of the original religious terrorist: the jewish Sicarii.
References
(1) Max Boot, 2013, 'Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present', 1st Edition, Liveright: New York, pp. 208-209
(2) Cf. Richard Horsley, 1979, 'The Sicarii: Ancient Jewish Terrorists', Journal of Religion, Vol. 59, pp. 435-458
(3) Peter Schaefer, 1995, 'The History of the Jews in Antiquity', 1st Edition, Routledge: New York, p. 73
(4) Joseph. Bel. Jud. 2:264
(5) Martin Goodman, 2008, 'Rome & Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations', 1st Edition, Penguin: New York, p. 407
(6) W. Oesterley, 1932, 'A History of Israel', Vol. 2, 1st Edition, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 434
(7) Ibid., p. 435; Martin Goodman, 1997, 'The Roman World 44 BC – AD 180', 1st Edition, Routledge: New York, pp. 255-256
(8) Sean Freyne, 2002, 'The Revolt from a Regional Perspective', p. 51 in Andrea Berlin, J. Andrew Overman (Eds.), 2002, 'The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology', 1st Edition, Routledge: New York
(9) Joseph. Bel. Jud. 2:427
(10) Schaefer, Op. Cit., p. 104
(11) Tessa Rajek, 2002, 'Jewish Millenarian Expectations', p.180 in Berlin, Overman, Op. Cit.
(12) Joseph. Bel. Jud. 2:408
(13) Danny Syon, 2002, 'Gamla: City of Refuge', p. 150 in Berlin, Overman, Op. Cit.
(14) Goodman, 'Rome & Jerusalem', Op. Cit., p. 426
(15) Schaefer, Op. Cit., p. 112
(16) Ibid., pp. 109-112
(17) Goodman, 'The Roman World', Op. Cit., pp. 256-257
(18) Goodman, 'Rome & Jerusalem', Op. Cit., pp. 456-457; see my article for more detail: https://karlradl14.substack.com/p/the-myth-of-masada
(19) Goodman, 'Rome & Jerusalem', Op. Cit., p. 461
(20) Cf. Boot, Op. Cit.
(21) Goodman, 'The Roman World', Op. Cit., p. 251
(22) Ibid., pp. 302-314